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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS WAYNE McCLOUD 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 14,817 
MAXINE LOWE BAUM, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries and property damage 
brought by the appellant, Thomas McCloud, when the motorcycle he 
was riding collided the automobile driven by the respondent, 
Maxine Baum, on-March 28, 1974. It is claimed that respondent 
was negligent in the manner in which she operated her vehicle. 
The respondent denies any negligence on her part. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court submitted the issues of liability and damages 
to the jury. The jury found that defendant was not negligent. The 
appellant's motions for a directed verdict and new trial were den-
ied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks to have the judgment of the trial court 
set aside and the case remanded with an order to enter a directed 
verdict on the issue of liability, and a new trial on the issue of 
damages alone. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this are quite simple and there is 
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dispute concerning them. On March 28, 1974, at approximately 4:oo 
p.m., the appellant riding his motorcycle, was returning from WOrk. 
lR. 281) He had just turned east on Center Street in Provo Utah 
, , 
from the old Geneva Road, (R. 281) and proceeded in an easterly 
direction on Center Street at a speed of approximately 30 m.p.h. 
(R. 281, 221, 250) The posted speed limit was 35 m.p.h. lR. 
2131 Center street in this area runs in an east-west direction, 
with one lane of traffic in each direction. (Ex . # 1) The road is 
level and straight. (R. 21 On this day, the weather was clear 
and the roads were dry. (R. 2801. Even though it was daylight, 
appellant had his headlight on, as was his custom, in order to be 
more visible to oncoming traffic. (R 2 81) After making his turn 
east on Center Street, appellant found himself behind a large 
truck carrying a camper. He followed this truck at a distance of 
some 30 feet. (R. 281, 2661 As the truck/camper approached the 
intersection of 16000 West and Center Street, the driver activa-
ted his left turn indicater and moved into the intersection to make 
a left turn onto 16000 West (R 281, 342) There is some dispute 
as to whether the truck/camper actually stopped within the inter-
section or merely slowed down at the intersection and made his 
turn without stopping. Neither the appellant nor the respondent 
remember. (R. 271, 297, 305, 342) The only independent witness 
was stopped to the north of the intersection waiting to make a 
left hand turn. He stated that the truck never blocked his vision 
of the motorcycle, but it did block his vision of the respondent's 
automobile, indicating that the truck had at least partially corn· 
pleted its turn prior to the collision. (R. 272) 
The respondent was approaching the intersection of 16000 west 
and Center from the east. As she neared the intersection, she 
-2-
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activated her left turn signal and came to a stop. (R. 356) She 
observed the truck/camper approaching with his left turn signal 
activated. She was able to see no cars behind the truck/camper 
and so proceeded to make her left turn. (R. 342) In the middle 
of her turn, she noticed the appellant about to enter the intersec-
tion from the west, but by that time it was too late to avoid the 
imminent collision, and the appellant collided into the respon-
dent's car. (R. 348, 343, 284). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RESPONDENT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING 
TO YIELD THE RIGHT-OF-WAY AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT. 
At the time of the accident in question in March, 1974, Sec-
tion 41-6-73, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provided: 
The driver of a vehicle within an intersection in-
tending to turn to the left shall yield the right 
of way to any vehicle approaching from the oppo-
site direction which is within the intersection or 
so close thereto as to constitute an immediate 
hazard, during the time when such driver is moving 
within the intersection. 
As set forth in §41-6-73, U.C.A., the driver of a vehicle executing 
a left turn must yield the right of way whenever an oncoming vehicle 
is "within the intersection or so close thereto as to constitute 
an immediate hazard, ..• " In mandating that the left turning 
driver yield the right-of-way, the statute places primary respon-
sibility upon the left turning driver to assess the conditions 
and potential hazards of the intended left turn, and requires that 
the left turn be attempted only when it is safe to do so. Further, 
the statute expressly states that if any approaching vehicle is so 
close to the intersection as to constitute an immediate hazard, 
-3-
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the left turning driver must yield the right-of-way to s h uc oncorn-
coming vehicle until it is safe to complete the turn. 
The rationale for such a rule is set forth in French v. Ut~ 
Oil Refining co., 117 Utah 406, 216 P.2d 1002 (1950), at page lOoi 
[The] burden is placed on the driver making the 
turn as he has control of the situation, and if 
there is a reasonable probability that the move-
ment cannot be made in safety then the disfavor-
ed driver should yield. The driver proceeding 
straight ahead has little opportunity to know a 
vehicle is to be turned across his path until 
the movement is commenced and in many instances, 
the warning is too late for the latter driver to 
take effective action. 
Left turns, as with other vehicular movements against the traffic 
flow, carry with them severe potential hazards. A left turning 
motorist usually must greatly reduce his speed, often coming to a 
complete stop in his own lane of traffic. He always changes his 
direction of travel, but most dangerously of all, he must cross 
over the lanes of traffic flowing in the opposite direction, risk· 
ing collision with approaching vehicles. Since it is the left 
turning motorist who creates the potentially hazardous situation, 
and since it is the left turner that controls the decision of 
whether the turn and when to turn, and thus upon his decision ex-
poses himself and oncoming vehicles to the possibilities of a col· 
lision, it is proper that the burden and responsibility of assess· 
ing the potential dangers involved fall upon him. 
Such a rule is sound. It finds its roots in the common law 
and is based upon common sense and practical experience. (For a 
case holding that a left turning motorist is required by conunon 
law to yield the right-of-way to an oncoming motorist, see Blay~: 
v. Westlund, 197 Or. 536, 254 P.2d 203 (1953)) Utah has long fol· 
lowed such a rule by statute, (See §57-7-137, U.C.A., 1953, for 
-4-
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predecessor to present statute), and most states have adopted stat-
utes identical or\ 2ry similar to Utah's statute. See, e.g., 
Oregon: §115-337 O.C.L.A.; California: Vehicle Code §551~ Colorado: 
§209, Chapter 16, C.S.A. 1935. 
The legislative history of the Utah statute controlling left 
turns reflects the continuing and increasing concern of the legis-
lature with regard to the dangers inherently associated with left 
turn maneuvers. Section 57-7-137, U.C.A. (1943), read as follows: 
The driver of a vehicle within an intersection in-
tending to turn to the left shall yield the right-
of-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite 
direction which is within the intersection or so 
close thereto as to constitute an immediate haz-
ard, but said driver, having so yielded and having 
given a signal when and as required by this act, 
may make such left turn and the drivers of all 
other vehicles approaching the intersection fro~ 
said opposite direction shall yeild the right-of-
way to the vehicle making the left turn. 
The above language was carried over word for word into the 1953 
code under §46-1-73. In 1961, however, the legislature deleted the 
following language from that section: 
.but said driver, having so yielded and having 
given a signal when and as required by this act, 
may make such left turn and the drivers of all 
other vehicles approaching the intersection from 
said opposite direction shall yield the right-of-
way to the vehicle making the left turn. 
In deleting this last phrase of §41-6-73, the Legislature clearly 
increased the burden placed on the left turning motorist. Prior 
to the deletion, once the left turner had activated his signal 
and came to a complete stop, he had the affirmative right to com-
plete his turn once all vehicles had passed which were dangerous-
ly close to the intersection when he first entered the intersec-
tion. All approaching vehicles which had not been close to the 
intersection had the affirmative duty to yield the right-of-way. 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The 1961 amendment to §41-6-73 also added the following un-
derlined language: 
... so close thereto as to constitute an immedi-
ate hazard, during the time when such driver is 
moving within the intersection. 
Under this language the left turning vehicle has the express du~ 
to yield the right-of-way to any approaching vehicles that would 
not only be so close as to constitute a hazard at the conunencement 
of the left turn, but also to any vehicles that would be so cloH 
as to constitute an immediate hazard any time. 
Justice Crockett, in writing the opinion for the Court in 
Smith v. Gallegos, 117 Utah 406, 400 P.2d 520 (1965), noted the 
increased burden imposed on the left turning motorist by the 1961 
amendment to §41-6-73, U.C.A. He states: 
The addition of the langauge just quoted clearly 
places a greater duty on the left turner in that 
he must yield not only to approaching vehicles 
close enough to constitute a hazard prior to be-
ginning his turn, but also to vehicles which will 
constitute a hazard "during the time he is moving 
within the intersection," which includes the time 
it will be necessary for him to complete his turn. 
~' supra, at 571. 
The 1961 amendment is clearly predicated upon the fact that 
in most, if not all situations, the left turning motorist not only 
has greater control over the situation but is also the one who 
creates any potential hazard. In light of this, the Legislature 
has determined that the policy of promoting safety on the highways 
is best served by placing a very heavy burden of responsibility 
upon the driver wishing to execute a left turn. 
While it is clear that the law places the primary responsibil· 
ity upon the left turning motorist, it does not require the left 
turning driver to be an absolute insurer of all accidents involv~ 
left turning vehicles. To interpret the statute in such a manner 
-6-
-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
as to find the left turning motorist negligent as a matter of law 
in every accident involving a left turning vehicle would be illogi-
cal, unrealistic, inconsistent with corrunon experience, and would 
not serve to promote safety. This Court has consistently rejected 
such a rule. In Walker v. Peterson, 3 Utah 2d 54, 278 P.2d 291 
(1954), Justice Crockett writing for the Court said: 
It is recongized that right of way, based on direc-
tion of travel, is the best and most easily ap-
plied rule as to driver preference at intersections. 
But in the very nature of things, it cannot be ab-
solute. If it were, in any situation where there 
was considerable traffic, it would be a practical 
impossibility to safely make a left turn, no mat-
ter how long one waited, nor with what care he pro-
ceeded; the driver proceeding directly through 
would have complete license to commit any kind of 
negligence and claim the right of way under all cir-
cumstances, regardless of speed, lookout, distance 
away when he observed the left turner, and notwith-
standing his own lack of care, always lay the res-
ponsibility upon the person making the left turn. 
It is so plain as to hardly warrant expression that 
one cannot, consistent with reason and justice, de-
termine beforehand that in every case involving 
such an intersection collision, the driver making the 
left turn is solely responsible for the mishap. 
Walker, supra, at 293. (emphasis added) 
The appellant does not question the above reasoning, and does 
not take the position that §41-6-73, U.C.A., requires that a left 
turning motorist be found negligent as a matter of law in every 
accident involving a left turning vehicle. There are many conceiv-
able situations when a left turning motorist should not be liable 
as a matter of law even though a collision occurred while making 
a left turn. Walker v. Petersen, 3 Utah 2d 54, 278 P.2d 291 (1954) 
presents such a case. In Walker, the oncoming motorist was speeding 
excessively. The left turning motorist was clearly visible to 
the oncoming mo tori.:; t for a great distance. To find the left turn-
ing motorist negligent as a matter of law in such a case, simply 
h2cause there occurred a collision involving a left turning vehi-
-7-
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= 
cle, would be tantamount to proclaming left turning drivers fair 
game for any motorist who could possibly hit him. Recognizing this. 
the Court said: 
Under the circumstances here, where the defendant 
was in the intersection substantially ahead of 
plaintiff in time, and was making the left turn 
when the plaintiff was far enough away that ordin-
ary reasonable care would require that he not in-
sist upon claiming the right of way, plaintiff 
cannot race on into the intersection and rely on 
it to exculpate himself from wrong. 
Walker, supra, at 293. 
Similarly, the case of Smith v. Gallegos, 117 Utah 406, 400 P.2d 
520 (1965), also involved an oncoming motorist who approached the 
intersection at an excessive rate of speed. In fact the evidence 
showed that not only was the oncoming truck speeding as it approach· 
ed the intersection, it continued accelerating as it entered the 
intersection. Smith, supra, at 572. In such a case, as in 
Walker, supra, even though an accident occurred involving a left 
turning motorist, it clearly would be erroneous to find the left 
turning motorist negligent as a matter of law by reason of §41-6-
73, U.C.A. 
It is clear from the Smith and Walker cases that not all acci· 
dents involving left turning vehicles should result in finding the 
left turning motorist negligent as a matter of law. It is equally 
clear that there are cases where the left turning motorist is 
negligent as a matter of law by reason of §41-6-73. The narrow 
fact situation presented by the instant case is clearly such a 
case. 
In the present case, the appellant was so close to the inter· 
section while the respondent executed her left turn as to consti· 
tute an immediate hazard within the meaning of §41-6-73, u.c.A., 
and therefore, the respondent was negligent as a matter of law in 
-R-
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failing to yield the right-of-way. According to testimony elicit-
ed from the investigating officer by the respondent's counsel, the 
respondent's vehicle travelled some 43 feet from the commencement 
of the left turn to the point of impact. (R. 232} Testimony was 
also elicited establishing the respondent's average speed to be 
between 5 and 8 m.p.h. during her left turn. (R. 230, 367) Based 
upon these figures, it was determined that at 8 m.p.h., 3.6 seconds 
would elapse from the time the left turn was commenced to the 
moment of collision. (R. 3 82} If the respondent's average speed 
was 5 rn.p.h., the elapsed time would have been 5.8 seconds. {R. 
382) It was further established that the appellant's motorcycle 
left 50 feet of skidmarks and that 1.9 seconds of actual braking 
time was required to leave those skid marks, (R. 234) and, ·in 
addition, that it would take approximately 1.5 seconds of reac-
tion time for the appellant to actually succeed in applying his 
brakes. (R. 222, 253) Adding the actual braking elapsed time 
(1.9 seconds) to the reaction elapsed time {1.5 seconds), we 
get 3.4 seconds as the minimum amount of time required for appel-
lant to slow his motorcycle to a speed of 5 m.p.h. at the point 
of impact. If we assume that the respondent executed her turn at 
8 m.p.h., thus requiring 3.7 seconds to arrive at the point of 
impact, since 3.4 seconds were required for the appellant to brake 
to a collision speed of 5 m.p.h. at the point of impact, it is 
obvious that from the moment the respondent commenced her turn, 
the appellant was so close to the intersection that the collision 
was unavoidable. Even if the appellant had been able to see the 
respondent commence her turn, and immediately responded by slam-
ming on his brakes, the collision still would have occurred. In 
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such a situation the appellant would, without question, be so 
close to the intersection at the commencement of the turn as to 
constitute an "immediate hazard". 
Now if we assume that the respondent's average turning speed 
was 5 m.p.h., the difference between the minimum time required 
for the appellant to slow to a 5 m.p.h. at the point of impact 
and the time necessary to complete the 43 foot turn to the point 
of impact is still only 2.5 seconds (5.9-3.4=2.5). If we assume 
again that the appellant is able to immediately percieve a danger 
situation and react to it immediately, even if he were able to 
observe the respondent the instant she commenced her turn, it 
would still be necessary to severely reduce his speed. This nec-
essary reduction of speed would not be the result of the appellant 
speeding as in Walker, supra, or Smith, supra. It was clearly 
established that the appellant was going 30 m.p.h. which is 5 
m.p.h. less than the posted speed limit. The reduction in speed 
would be caused by the respondent turning left in front of the 
appellant when he was so close that he would be required to irnrnedi· 
ately and drastically reduce his speed to avoid a collision. Such 
a reduction in speed would properly be termed an evasive action 
to avoid a collision. 
The above computations clearly show that regardless of 
whether the respondent's average turning speed was 5 m.p.h. or 
8 m.p.h. or something in between (which is most likely), the 
appellant was so close to the intersection at the time when the 
respondent commenced her left turn that he had been able to see 
the respondent when she commenced her left turn, the accident 
either could not have been avoided at all, or would have been 
avoided only by the narrowest of margins and only by the appel-
-10-
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lant taking immediate action to avoid a collision. The appel-
lant submits that he was, therefore, "so close to the turning 
vehicle as to constitute an immediate hazard" as contemplated by 
§41-6-73, and that the respondent was, therefore, required by law 
to yield the right-of-way to him. In failing to do so, she was 
negligent as a matter of law. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING TO 
KEEP A PROPER LOOKOUT IN THAT SHE ATTEMPTED TO EXECUTE A LEFT 
TURN WITHOUT ASCERTAINING WHETHER IT WAS SAFE TO DO SO. THE 
TRIAL COURT, THEREFORE, ERRED IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION 
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
The respondent claims that she did not see the appe~lant 
approaching and, therefore, did not realize that he was so danger-
ously close. Such a response does not excuse her from complying 
with the provisions of §41-6-73. Such a response is merely an 
admission of her further negligence in failing to keep a proper 
lookout. It was not impossible for the respondent to see the ap-
pellant approaching, she simply failed to make the necessary ef-
fort to showly move to a position that would have allowed her to 
observe any approaching vehicles. 
In the present case, the respondent's view of oncoming traf-
fic was at least partially blocked by the oncoming truck/camper 
that was about to turn left in front of the respondent. (R. 343) 
The respondent states that she looked to see if any cars were 
coming, and seeing none, she made her left turn. (R. 342} But 
when one's vision is blocked as the respondent's admittedly was, 
it is not enough to merely look in the general direction of the 
C11Jproaching traffic and then commence turning. The proper rule 
-11-
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....., 
in such a case is that upon entering an intersection, if one's 
vision is blocked, one has the duty to cautiously move to a posi-
tion where he can effeciently observe traffic, stop again and 
make an effective observation, and then proceed only when it is 
safe to do so. In ~v. Transport Indem Co., 23 Wis. 2d 182, 
127 N.W.2d 251 (19641, it was held that when one's vision is so 
blocked upon entering an intersection, it is negligence as a ma~ 
ter of law to fail to follow such a procedure. 
Had the respondent followed the above rule, she would have 
had a clear view of the road ahead. She could have observed the 
appellant who was about to enter the intersection, and the acci-
dent would have been avoided. Her failure to so act amounted to 
negligence as a matter of law. 
The above rule is sound. It is not a great burden to require 
a left turning motorist who, upon entering an intersection, finds 
his vision blocked by an obstruction, to move to a position where 
he can effectively observe all approaching traffic. Such a pro-
cedure would require only an additional one or two seconds and 
would effectively reduce the possibility of a collision between a 
left turning vehicle and oncoming traffic. The current popular-
ity of campers, vans and large motor homes make such a rule even 
more important. A truck with a camper, a large van, or a motor 
home can easily obscure many types of vehicles, not only motor-
cycles, but also many smaller cars that are seen with such increas· 
ing frequency on the highways. To not require left turning motor· 
ists whose vision is blocked by an obstruction to move to a point 
where the vision is no longer obstructed before attempting to com· 
plete a left turn, will only serve to invite an increasing number 
of accidents involving smaller cars and motorcycles, which are 
-12-
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easily hidden by larger vehicles. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 41-6-73, U.C.A., requires that left turning motorists 
yield the right-of-way to approaching vehicles that are within the 
intersection or so close to the intersection as to constitute an 
immediate hazard. The appellant was "so close to the intersection 
as to constitute an irrunediate hazard" within the meaning of the 
statute, and, therefore, the respondent was negligent as a matter 
of law in failing to yield the right-of-way. Further, the respon-
dent was negligent as a matter of law in that she attempted to 
turn left while her view of oncoming traffic was blocked. Had she 
made a minimal effort to get a clear view of the oncoming traffic, 
she would have observed the appellant who was about to eater the 
intersection and the accident would have been avoided. The appel-
lant, therefore, respectfully urges that this Court vacate the 
verdict of the lower court and render judgment for the appellant 
on the issue of liability and remand the case on the issue of 
damages. 
Respectfully submitted this //~h day of April, 1977. 
::;;5:;5;:~ -
DON R. PETERSEN, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on the 111 h day of April, 1977, I mailed two 
C2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
Ray H. Ivie, Attorney for Respondent, 48 North University Ave., 
Provo, Utah 84601. 
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